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Abstract 
A large number of studies show that war and terrorism have a significant 
effect on individuals’ political attitudes.  Yet, this extensive literature does not 
inspect the mechanisms behind this effect.  This paper concentrates on one 
possible mechanism, by differentiating between the human toll of terror and 
war and the economic costs they cause.  For these purposes we focus on the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and use variation in the level of violence across 
time and space together with localities’ different exposure to the tourism 
sector to estimate their respective effects on political attitudes.  Our results 
suggest that whereas fatalities from the conflict make Israelis more willing to 
grant territorial concessions to the Palestinians, the associated economic costs 
of conflict do not have a consistent significant effect on individuals’ political 
attitudes.  
 
 
Keywords:  Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Political Attitudes, Economic Costs 
of Conflict, Tourism. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
Military conflicts and terror campaigns usually result in a substantial human 
toll in terms of civilian and military casualties.  In addition to these 
devastating effects, war and terrorism also tend to have important economic 
effects on the targeted societies.  A rapidly expanding literature indeed 
illustrates that wars and periods of increased terrorist activity often cause, for 
example, trade disruptions, forgone foreign direct investment, declining tourist 
activity and/or the destruction of industrial capacity and loss of human capital 
(see Arunatilake et al., 2001; Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003 and 2008; 
Fielding, 2003a and 2003b; Koubi, 2005; Zussman and Zussman, 2006; 
Sandler and Enders, 2008; and Blomberg and Rose, 2009; among many 
others).1  
Although there exists a vast literature linking the number of casualties in 
armed conflicts to voters’ political attitudes, this literature does not address the 
effects of the economic cost of conflict on voters’ political attitudes.  The 
seminal work of Mueller (1973), for example, extensively analyzed the effect 
that fatalities in the Korean and Vietnam Wars had on public opinion in the 
United States.  He showed that mounting casualty rates not only caused a 
decrease in the support for the war itself, but also had a dramatic effect on the 
share of U.S. citizens’ approval rating of the incumbent president.   
Today, there is a broad consensus that “casualties ultimately drag down 
[incumbent] job approval” (Eichenberg and Stoll, 2006, 802).  Most of the 
evidence comes from the U.S.  This evidence shows that, whether casualties 
are measured cumulatively or marginally (Gartner and Segura, 1998; Welsch, 
2008; Geys, 2010), such negative relation between casualties and U.S. leaders’ 
approval ratings exists for the Korean and Vietnam Wars (e.g., Gartner and 
Segura, 1998; 2000), World War II (e.g., Kriner, 2006) and the current 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan (e.g., Eichenberg and Stoll, 2006; Voeten 
and Brewer, 2006; Geys, 2010; Karol and Miguel, 2007).   
This regularity holds outside the U.S. as well.  For example, Gassebner 
et al. (2008, 2011) show that the severity of terrorist attacks increases the 
probability of government failure and decreases cabinet duration in a sample 
of over 150 countries over the period 1968-2002.  Montalvo (2011) and 
Gardeazabal (2010) suggest the same effect in a case study of Spain focusing, 
respectively, on the 2004 Madrid bombings and the Basque conflict.  Directly 
related to this article’s conflict of interest, Berrebi and Klor (2006, 2008) and 
Gould and Klor (2010) similarly found that rising casualty counts have a 
significant effect on Israeli public opinion.   
                                                 
1  That said, some scholars have argued that wars may have at least some positive economic 
effects. Increased military expenditures may act as a Keynesian expansionary policy that 
stimulates aggregate demand (Monroe, 1978), and military research may lead to technological 
innovations that stimulate long-term growth and exports (Ruttan, 2006; Berrebi and Klor, 
2010). 
 Despite the large literature on the political effects of fatalities there 
aren’t, to the best of our knowledge, similar studies on the impact of the 
economic costs of conflict on individuals’ political attitudes.  This article 
attempts to start filling this void by exploring whether the economic costs 
associated with conflict have important political repercussions, much like the 
human cost of conflicts.  Since peace and prosperity constitute “two 
indisputable goals” in the minds of voters when evaluating their leaders and 
their actions (Nickelsburg and Norpoth, 2000, pp. 314), we expect that the 
economic costs of conflict should also affect voters’ political attitudes.  This 
proposition follows from an extensive literature on economic voting, which 
has shown that the state of the economy has a considerable influence on 
electoral outcomes (for a review, see Lewis-Beck and Stegmayer, 2007).  
However, unlike this literature, our prime concern does not lie in the political 
repercussions of a country’s overall economic situation, but rather centers on 
the particular effects of the economic costs associated with armed conflicts.  
Hence, we take the substantial economic costs of armed conflicts as a starting 
point to ask whether, and how, they affect voters’ political preferences 
separately from the conflict’s toll in terms of the number of casualties. 
This article focuses on the effects of the political and economic 
consequences of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on Israelis’ political attitudes 
between 1996 and 2009.  This period includes the second Lebanon War in July 
2006, the Israeli military incursion in the Gaza Strip in December 2008 
(known as Operation Cast Lead), as well as the second Intifada and numerous 
individual acts of aggression.  Hence, the period covered provides us with 
substantial temporal and geographic variation in the human and economic 
costs of the conflict, which we use in our econometric analysis.   
In particular, we measure individuals’ political attitudes with the help of 
very detailed surveys that provide us with micro-level data on individuals’ 
political attitudes and their demographic characteristics.  We merge this 
information with a comprehensive dataset on Israeli military and civilian 
fatalities in wars and terror attacks during the same time period.  Finally, we 
measure the economic costs of conflict using the number of Jewish workers in 
the tourism sector (as a share of the total number of employees) in a given sub-
district.  We focus on this variable as our main variable of interest because it is 
highly correlated with the incidence of wars or terrorists attacks, and it has a 
great deal of local variation that is not correlated with the political attitudes of 
the sub-districts’ residents.  Hence, our identification rests upon the fact that 
the deviations from each district’s temporal trend capture mostly the effect of 
violent political conflict on economic activity and is mostly unaffected by 
other economic shocks. 
As mentioned, we use a panel regression analysis based on the 
substantial temporal and geographic variation in terms of fatalities and 
economic cost over this period to identify each cost’s independent effects on 
the political preferences of the Israeli population (proxied through voters’ 
willingness to grant territorial concessions to Palestinians, and their position 
 on a left-right ideological axis).  Our main results suggest that Israelis’ 
willingness to grant territorial concessions is significantly affected by the 
number of Israeli fatalities, but remains largely unaffected by the conflict’s 
economic costs. 
The article extends the literature on wars and public opinion initiated by 
Mueller (1973) by moving beyond casualty counts as the primary – and 
usually only – indicator of the cost of conflicts.2  This allows us not only to 
evaluate the existence and relevance of an alternative transmission channel 
between armed conflicts and public opinion (thus painting a more complete 
picture of this relation), but also to test for potential omitted variable bias in 
earlier work.  While we did not find a significant effect of the economic costs 
of conflict in the Israeli electorate, this result may well be different for other 
countries.  Indeed, to the extent that casualties and the economic costs of 
conflict are correlated (via, say, losses in human capital; e.g., Arunatilake et 
al., 2001), exclusive focus on casualties may lead to incorrect inferences when 
ignoring either variable.  
The article proceeds as follows. The next section provides an exhaustive 
description of the datasets.  Section 3 explains the chosen empirical design.  
The results are presented in Section 4.  The last section concludes.  
 
2. Data  
 
For the purposes of our analysis we combine three different data sets: (i) a 
dataset with information on the political preferences of the Israeli electorate; 
(ii) a dataset on fatalities from wars and terror attacks; and (iii) a dataset on 
local economic activity.  While the first two datasets were used in previous 
studies, the main contribution of our paper is the addition to the analysis of 
exogenous variation in local economic activity, captured by the third dataset. 
 
2.1 Data on Political Preferences 
 
We use data on the political preferences as well as socio-demographic 
characteristics of the Israeli population from The Israel National Election 
Studies (INES) and the Democracy Index Survey (DIS).  The INES is 
conducted before every parliamentary election in Israel since 1969, whereas 
the DIS is carried out on almost a yearly basis.  There are a lot of similarities 
between the two surveys: i.e., both are based on a representative sample of 
Israeli voters and contain very similar questions on their political preferences 
and demographic characteristics.  Importantly, the available demographic 
characteristics include individuals’ place of residence.  This is crucial for our 
                                                 
2 See Geys (2010), however, for a recent exception.  Geys (2010) evaluates how the fiscal cost 
of warfare affected U.S. presidential popularity over the period 1948-2006.  He finds that 
higher fiscal costs of military interventions are detrimental to U.S. presidents’ popularity – 
though this effect significantly weakens when unemployment rates are higher.  
 purposes since it allows us to use their distribution across the 19 Israeli sub-
districts to test the local effects of conflict and its associated local economic 
costs on the political attitudes of the local population.  
In this paper, we use several of the surveys’ questions regarding the 
political preferences of each respondent with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict.  In particular, we focus on three types of questions.  The questions we 
use are the ones that (i) examine the respondent’s position about granting 
territorial concessions to the Palestinians as part of a peace agreement; (ii) ask 
for the party the respondent supports in the approaching elections; and (iii) ask 
for the respondent’s self-defined political tendency on a left-right scale. All 
these questions appear with relatively minor changes every year since 1996 
(except 1997).3  
When the political landscape remains constant over time, it seems 
reasonable to expect that all three questions exhibit a similar pattern.  
However, as shown by Gould and Klor (2010), the political platforms of 
Israeli political parties are shifting over time. This clearly reduces the last two 
questions’ ability to capture the political attitudes of Israeli citizens regarding 
a particular political issue.  Therefore, while we present results for all three 
attitudes, our preferred measure of political preferences is the respondents’ 
willingness to grant territorial concessions to the Palestinians.   
While every survey asks each respondent to provide his or her position 
regarding the territorial concessions he or she is willing to grant the 
Palestinians, the structure of the actual question varies slightly over time.  
Table 1 presents the structure and exact wording of this question for all the 
available surveys.  As can be seen from this table, over the time period at issue 
the question’s wording as well as possible answers changed across surveys.  
For example, in the surveys from 1996 until 2000 individuals were asked to 
use an 8-point scale to indicate (dis)agreement on the question: “Israel should 
give back territories to the Palestinians for peace,” whereas in the surveys of 
2001 and 2004 individuals were asked:  “To what extent do you agree or 
disagree to a Palestinian state with 95% of Gaza Strip and West Bank, while 
Israel keeps settlement blocks?” Following Gould and Klor (2010), we created 
a dichotomous measure representing individuals’ willingness to agree to 
territorial concessions.  The exact construction of this variable also appears in 
Table 1.  While we believe we use a sensible rule, our empirical analysis tests 
for the robustness of the results to alternative approaches to code these data. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the survey data.  The third 
column of this table shows the percentage of individuals willing to make 
territorial concessions.  This column shows that the share of those willing to 
make concessions increased from 43% to 49% between 1996 and 2000.  For 
                                                 
3 The INES and DIS questionnaires are available online at the Israel Democracy Institute’s 
website (http://www.idi.org.il/sites/english/Pages/homepage.aspx).  See Arian and Shamir 
(2011) and Arian et al. (2010) for the latest publications using INES and DIS data, 
respectively.  
 surveys using the exact same question, a similar increase took place between 
2002 (41%) and 2005 (66%).  In contrast, the willingness to grant territorial 
concessions declined between 2005 (66%) and 2009 (49%) – possibly because 
of the unilateral Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005 and the 
subsequent electoral victory of Hamas in the 2006 Palestinian elections.  In the 
empirical analysis, all regressions include survey fixed effects to neutralize as 
much as possible the impact of changes in the structure of the questions.  
Table 2 also presents summary statistics for the second political variable 
of interest, the one measuring the respondents’ self-classification across the 
left-right political spectrum.  We code with a value of one all respondents 
describing themselves as belonging to the “right” or “moderate right” camp, 
and a value of zero to all the rest.  Table 2 indicates that there is a general 
upward trend over time, though with noticeable fluctuations, in the share of 
self-reported “right-wingers.”  It should be noted, however, that the stated 
political agenda of Likud – the largest and most important right-wing party – 
underwent substantial changes over the last 30 years.  As this is likely to 
become reflected in the share of individuals perceiving themselves as right-
wing, the question on territorial concessions has an important advantage in 
terms of having a more constant meaning over time. 
Finally, our third proxy for individuals’ political preferences measures 
the intention of an individual to vote for a party in the “right-wing bloc” (or 
the “National Camp”) in the upcoming elections.  The surveys ask every 
individual: “If the elections for the Knesset (Israeli parliament) were held 
today, for which party would you vote?”  While some parties, such as the 
Likud and National Union, clearly belong to the right-wing bloc, there are 
parties that are less easily assigned to one of the blocs (e.g., some of the 
religious parties).  In this paper, we assign parties to the right and left blocs 
following the classification suggested by Shamir and Arian (1999).  Column 5 
in Table 2 shows that fluctuations in the support for the right bloc usually 
follow the fluctuations in the share of right-wing individuals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1 Structure and Wording of Questions on Willingness to Grant Concessions 
Surveys Question wording  Possible answers and scale  
Our coding: 
willingness to 
make territorial 
concessions = 1; 
otherwise = 0 
            
5/1996 
Should Israel return territories 
for peace 
 
A rank between 1 and 7. 
1stands for "strongly 
disagree;" 7 stands for 
"strong agree."  
 
 2/1998   5 to 7 = 1; 
1/1999    1 to 4  = 0. 
4/1999    
2/2000      
            
1/2001 Palestinian state with 95% of 
Gaza Strip and West Bank, 
Israel will keep settlement 
blocks  
 
1-strongly oppose  
 2/2004  
2- oppose  3 and 4 = 1; 
 
 
3- support  1 and 2 = 0. 
 
 
4-strongly support   
            
7/2002 
Territories should be exchanged 
for peace 
 
1- Definitely agree  
 1/2003  
2- Agree  1 and 2 = 1; 
9/2005  
3- Disagree  3 and 4 = 0. 
3/2006  
4- Strongly disagree   
            
4/2003 
In your opinion should Israel 
return to 67 borders in 
exchange for peace 
 
1- definitely yes  
 
 
 
2- yes  1 and 2 = 1; 
 
 
3- no  3 and 4 = 0. 
 
 
4- definitely no).   
            
7/2005 
Settlements evacuation as part 
of a permanent agreement  
 
1-not to evacuate at all  
 1/2008  
2-only small settlements  2 and 3 = 1; 
2/2009  
3-evacuate all settlements  1 = 0. 
3/2009         
            
2/2007 
With regard to the territories 
occupied by Israel after 1967, 
what is the greatest concession 
Israel should make in order to 
achieve peace? 
 
1- Return all  
 
 
2- Return the most  1 to 4 = 1; 
 
3- Return part  5 = 0. 
 
4- Return small part   
  5- Return nothing     
      Notes: The surveys of 5/1996, 4/1999, 1/2001, 1/2003, 3/2006, 2/2009 were conducted before elecitons 
by the INES. The rest of the surveys were conducted by DIS.  
 
 Table 2 - Summary Statistics on Political Preferences, Economic Indicator and Fatalities, By 
Survey 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Survey 
Date 
Number of 
observations 
Willingness 
to make  
territorial 
concessions 
Right-wing 
political 
tendency 
Vote for 
right-bloc 
parties 
Share of 
workers in 
the tourism 
sector 
Number of 
fatalities per 
capita during 
previous year 
(per 1,000 
individuals) 
5/1996 1,161 0.427 0.471 0.438 0.04 0.036 (0.495) (0.499) (0.496) (0.018) 
2/1998 1,197 0.442 0.533 0.452 0.036 0.044 (0.497) (0.499) (0.498) (0.015) 
1/1999 1,114 0.447 0.523 0.467 0.038 0.024 (0.497) (0.500) (0.499) (0.017) 
4/1999 910 0.489 0.444 0.404 0.037 0.023 (0.500) (0.497) (0.491) (0.014) 
2/2000 1,084 0.49 0.439 0.362 0.036 0.018 (0.500) (0.496) (0.481) (0.011) 
1/2001 1,197 0.38 0.549 0.463 0.044 0.027 (0.486) (0.498) (0.499) (0.024) 
7/2002 985 0.406  
0.409 0.037 0.084 (0.491) (0.492) (0.015) 
1/2003 1,081 0.541 0.579 0.479 0.043 0.081 (0.499) (0.494) (0.500) (0.019) 
4/2003 1,064 0.381 0.575 0.457 0.044 0.065 (0.486) (0.495) (0.498) (0.018) 
2/2004 1,088 0.306 0.59 0.456 0.037 0.044 (0.461) (0.492) (0.498) (0.014) 
3/2004 964  
0.547 0.392 0.038 0.045 (0.498) (0.488) (0.014) 
7/2005 1,603 0.664 0.497 0.393 0.043 0.024 (0.473) (0.500) (0.489) (0.016) 
9/2005 731 0.589 0.467 0.374 0.045 0.024 (0.492) (0.499) (0.484) (0.017) 
2/2006 1,008 
 0.544 0.367 0.046 0.018  (0.498) (0.482) (0.018) 
3/2006 1,586 0.543 0.539 0.356 0.045 0.018 (0.498) (0.499) (0.479) (0.018) 
2/2007 1,020 0.473 0.619 0.36 0.047 0.038 (0.500) (0.486) (0.480) (0.017) 
 Table 2 – (continued) 
1/2008 971 0.445 0.582 0.344 0.043 0.007 (0.497) (0.494) (0.475) (0.013) 
2/2009 318 0.578 0.538 0.415 0.045 0.014 (0.495) (0.499) (0.494) (0.017) 
3/2009 1,229 0.49 0.586 0.448 0.043 0.014 (0.500) (0.493) (0.498) (0.016) 
       Entries in the political attitudes represent the average of the respective variable for each survey. Standard 
deviations appear in parenthesis. The numbers of observations refer to the total number of Israeli Jewish 
individuals interviewed in each survey. The exact number of observations for each variable varies 
slightly because not all respondents answered all questions. Sources: Israeli National Elections Study 
(INES) and Democratic Index. Column (6) uses data from the Labor Force Survey (LFS). The last 
column reports the number of fatalities per capita (per 1,000 individuals) from war and terrorism. 
Sources: "Laad" and "Izkor". 
 
2.2 Data on Israeli Fatalities 
 
Like many other empirical studies on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we also 
use the total number of Israeli fatalities during wars and terror attacks as our 
proxy for the severity of the conflict.4  Note that most of the fatalities from 
wars are soldiers whereas the overwhelming majority of fatalities in terror 
attacks are civilians.  The information on total fatalities comes from two main 
sources.  The first source is Laad, a website of the Israeli National Insurance 
Institute (Israeli Social Security; http://laad.btl.gov.il) that provides 
information on every Israeli civilian fatality of war or terrorism.  The 
information includes the individuals’ place of residence and exact date of the 
incident.  The second source is Izkor, a website of the Defense Ministry of 
Israel (http://www.izkor.gov.il) that provides information on Israeli security 
forces’ fatalities.  As with the data on civilian casualties, we use their 
information regarding the date of the incident and these fatalities’ place of 
residence.  Figure 1 and Column (7) of Table 2 show the fluctuation of this 
variable over time.  The figure and table show a substantial increase on the 
number of fatalities during 2002 and 2003, the bloodiest years of the Second 
Intifada.  We see afterwards a gradual decrease on the number of fatalities, 
with 2008 and 2009 being the two years with the lowest number of Israeli 
fatalities since the beginning of the second Intifada.  
 
 
Figure 1: Number of Israeli Fatalities Over Time 
                                                 
4 Some studies use both Israeli and Palestinian fatalities as their main variable of interest 
(Jaeger and Paserman, 2008 and 2009), while others focus exclusively on Israeli fatalities 
(Becker and Rubinstein, 2011; Benmelech et al., 2010; Gould and Stecklov, 2009; Stecklov 
and Goldstein, 2006) or Palestinian fatalities (Jaeger et al. 2010 and 2012).  
  
 
Data Sources: Israeli National Insurance Institute and Israeli Defense 
Ministry. 
 
2.3 Data on Local Economic Activity 
 
This study places special emphasis on the effect of economic conditions (as 
affected by violent political conflict) on the political attitudes of the Israeli 
population.  A major challenge associated with our econometric estimation 
thereby lies in the ability to separate the effect of violent political conflict on 
economic activity from other economic shocks.  For example, a general 
economic indicator such as GDP is affected by many factors other than violent 
political conflict.  Hence, while such a general indicator is affected by political 
violence, it is also affected by other shocks. This makes it less suitable for the 
purposes of this paper. 
In our estimations, we particularly focus on the number of Jewish 
workers in the tourism sector as a share of the total number of employees in a 
given sub-district as our main variable of interest.  We believe that this 
variable provides a very good proxy to the economic consequences of war and 
terror attacks for two main reasons.  First, it is highly correlated to the 
incidence of wars or terrorists attacks (e.g., Enders et al., 1992; Drakos and 
Kutan, 2003).  Second, it displays a great deal of local variation that is not 
correlated with the political attitudes of the sub-districts’ residents.  This 
variation results in different effects on the local economy of each district. 
In support of our first claim above, we follow Eckstein and Tsiddon 
(2004) by looking at the number of nights that foreign tourists spend in Israeli 
hotels.  Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) claim that security events and their 
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 number of fatalities explain most of this index’s short-term fluctuations.  More 
specifically, they find that whereas the number of tourists visiting Israel is 
unaffected by Israel’s general economic conditions, this index is significantly 
negatively affected by war and terrorism.  Figure 2 shows the fluctuation in 
the number of nights in Israeli hotels of foreign tourists over the time period at 
issue.  The figure corroborates that short-term fluctuations on this index are 
closely related to security events.  We see, for example, a sharp decrease in the 
number of foreign tourists’ visits to Israel right at the beginning of the Second 
Intifada.  The number of foreign visitors remained low throughout 2002 and 
2003, the two most violent years of the Intifada, and recovered slowly 
afterwards, reaching its pre-Intifada levels only in 2007, a couple of years after 
the end of the Second Intifada.  
 
Figure 2: Number of nights foreign tourists stay in Israeli Hotels and 
Major Security Events 
 
1. Operation "The Grapes of Wrath" (48 fatalities). 
2. "Al-aqsa" Intifada (81 fatalities). 
3. Operation "Defensive Shield" (179 fatalities). 
4. Iraq war (103 fatalities). 
5. Second Lebanon war (194 fatalities). 
6. Gaza War (24 fatalities). 
* The average number of fatalities between the years 1996-2009 is 55 
per quarter. 
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Our second claim is that the large fluctuations on foreign visitors at the 
national level, affect sub-districts differently.  Figure 3 shows the fluctuation 
of foreign tourists nights in Israeli hotels but differentiating between Jerusalem 
and Eilat, two of the most touristic destinations in Israel.  The figure clearly 
shows that local terror events have a local effect on the number of foreign 
tourists.  
 
Figure 3: Number of Nights Tourists Stay in Hotels in Jerusalem and 
Eilat and Major Security Events 
 
1. Operation "The Grapes of Wrath" (48 fatalities). 
2. "Al-aqsa" Intifada (81 fatalities). 
3. Operation "Defensive Shield" (179 fatalities). 
4. Iraq war (103 fatalities). 
5. Second Lebanon war (194 fatalities). 
6. Gaza War (24 fatalities). 
* The average number of fatalities between the years 1996-2009 is 55 
per quarter. 
 
 We observe that the number of visitors to Jerusalem and Eilat significantly 
decreased on the wake of the Second Intifada.  That said, whereas the number 
of tourists visiting Jerusalem gradually increased to its previous level together 
with the decrease on terror attacks in Jerusalem, the number of foreign visitors 
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 to Eilat remained at low levels of roughly a third of its pre-Intifada number of 
visitors.5 
The different geographic impact of fluctuations in tourism is crucial for 
our identification strategy.  It allows us to focus on the number of Jewish 
workers in tourism as a share of the total number of employees in a given sub-
district as our main variable of interest.  We believe that this variable provides 
a very good proxy to the economic consequences of war and terror attacks 
because it is highly correlated, both at the national and sub-district level, with 
the number of nights that foreign tourists spend at Israeli hotels.6  The data 
come from the Israeli Labor Force Survey (ILFS), which is carried out every 
quarter by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics.  This database includes 
information on the economic sector of work for each individual as well as his 
or her place of residence.  These two variables allow us to compute the share 
of workers in the tourism sector for each of the 19 sub-districts in every 
quarter since 1995.   
Beside the share of the local population working in the tourism industry, 
we also looked at alternative economic indicators.  In particular, we collected 
from the ILFS data on the sub-district unemployment rate for each quarter 
during the time period at issue.  In addition, we calculated total expenditures 
per household using the Household Expenditure Survey (carried out annually 
since 1997), and net income per adult from the Current Income Survey 
(carried out annually since 1955).  All the surveys used contain information on 
the residence of every individual/household, which enables us to compute the 
sub-district averages of net income and expenditure per household for all 19 
sub-districts on a yearly basis.   
We tested the effect of local fatalities from conflict on each of these 
variables.  The results, available from the authors upon request, confirm our 
previous expectations.  In particular, they show that local fatalities per capita 
have a significant and negative effect on the share of workers in the tourism 
sector (the coefficient equals -0.042 and the standard error equals 0.022).  On 
the contrary, local fatalities per capita are correlated with a decrease in 
unemployment and an increase in a subdistrict’s income.  These unexpected 
results may reflect the predominance of the effects of other shocks to these 
more general measures of economic activity.  As mentioned, this is the reason 
                                                 
5  Eilat is a city at the South of Israel with sunny beaches facing the red sea. Before the Second 
Intifada, there were over 45 weekly flights bringing Scandinavian and Dutch tourists to Eilat 
in search of sunny beaches during their harsh winter. The Intifada caused a sharp decrease in 
the number of foreign tourists visiting Eilat, to the point that there were less than three weekly 
flights from those locations to Eilat in 2004 (Ernst & Young, 2006). As of 2011, over five 
years after the end of the Second Intifada, the number of tourists visiting Eilat is still 
significantly lower than that observed during the late 1990s (Zaletz, 2011). 
6  We are interested in measuring the local economic impact of terror and war.  Unfortunately, 
we do not have data on hotel workers’ sub-district of residence.  We focus exclusively on 
Jewish workers because those that work in the tourism industry tend to reside in the same 
district where they work. This is not necessarily the case for the Arab workers in this industry. 
 that renders these measures less appropriate to our goal of capturing mostly 
the economic effects of armed violence. 
Table 3 depicts the geographic variation of the variables of interest 
across sub-districts.  The table shows that there is a great deal of variation in 
terms of sub-district populations’ political attitudes, share of workers in the 
tourism industry and number of fatalities from conflict.  Of course, some of 
the variation in political attitudes may be due to differences in unobservable 
characteristics of the sub-districts’ populations.  In our econometric 
estimation, which we describe below, we control for sub-district fixed effects 
and test whether the variation in political preferences across sub-districts is 
correlated with the observed local variation in the number of fatalities and the 
economic costs of conflict.    
Table 3 - Summary Statistics on Political Preferences, Economic Indicator and Fatalities, By Sub-
District 
Sub-district  
Willingness to 
make  
territorial 
concessions 
 
Right-wing 
political 
tendency  
Vote for right-
bloc parties   
Share of 
workers in 
tourism sector  
Number of 
fatalities per 
capita within 
a year of 
surveys (per 
1,000 
individuals) 
            
Akko 
 0.4554 
 
0.5340 
 
0.3976 
  
0.0375 
 
0.0268 
 (0.499) (0.499) (0.490) (0.009) (0.019) 
            
Ashkelon 
 0.357 
 
0.6254 
 
0.4948 
  
0.0334 
 
0.0317 
 (0.479) (0.484) (0.500) (0.005) (0.016) 
    
 
 
 
     
Be'er Sheva 
 0.4392 
 
0.5732 
 
0.4459 
  
0.0844 
 
0.0292 
 (0.479) (0.495) (0.497) (0.009) (0.013) 
    
 
 
 
     
Golan 
Heights 
 0.4324 
 
0.5500 
 
0.325 
  
0.0864 
 
0.0267 
 (0.502) (0.504) (0.474) (0.040) (0.042) 
    
 
 
 
     
Hadera 
 0.5312 
 
0.5255 
 
0.4165 
  
0.0404 
 
0.0354 
 (0.500) (0.500) (0.494) (0.009) (0.035) 
    
 
 
 
     
Haifa 
 0.5511 
 
0.4481 
 
0.3385 
  
0.0323 
 
0.0382 
 (0.498) (0.497) (0.473) (0.005) (0.034) 
    
 
 
 
     
Holon 
 0.4592 
 
0.5398 
 
0.4221 
  
0.0363 
 
0.0263 
 (0.499) (0.499) (0.494) (0.004) (0.025) 
    
 
 
 
     
Jerusalem 
 0.3432 
 
0.6644 
 
0.535 
  
0.0354 
 
0.0436 
 (0.475) (0.472) (0.499) (0.005) (0.040) 
    
 
 
 
     
 Table 3 – (continued) 
Jezreel 
Valley 
 0.4825 
 
0.5357 
 
0.4421 
  
0.0292 
 
0.0449 
 )0.500(  )0.499(  )0.497(  )0.008(  )0.035(  
    
 
 
 
     
Nazareth 
 0.4275 
 
0.5263 
 
0.3885 
  
0.0264 
 
0.0101 
 )0.497(  )0.501(  )0.489(  )0.013(  )0.008(  
    
 
 
 
     
Petah 
Tiqwa 
 0.4886 
 
0.4778 
 
0.3469 
  
0.0295 
 
0.0299 
 )0.500(  )0.500(  )0.476(  )0.004(  )0.017(  
    
 
 
 
     
Ramat Gan 
 0.4848 
 
0.5805 
 
0.4507 
  
0.0336 
 
0.0135 
 )0.500(  )0.494(  )0.498(  )0.004(  )0.013(  
    
 
 
 
     
Ramla 
 0.4345 
 
0.6705 
 
0.5082 
  
0.0321 
 
0.0292 
 )0.496(  )0.470(  )0.500(  )0.006(  )0.024(  
    
 
 
 
     
Rehovot 
 0.4969 
 
0.5165 
 
0.3986 
  
0.0323 
 
0.0331 
 )0.500(  )0.500(  )0.490(  )0.004(  )0.021(  
    
 
 
 
     
Sea of 
Galilee 
 0.3915 
 
0.5510 
 
0.4475 
  
0.0845 
 
0.0454 
 )0.489(  )0.498(  )0.498(  )0.020(  )0.037(  
    
 
 
 
     
Sharon 
 0.4829 
 
0.5350 
 
0.4164 
  
0.0461 
 
0.036 
 )0.500(  )0.499(  )0.493(  )0.008(  )0.029(  
    
 
 
 
     
Tel-Aviv 
 0.6067 
 
0.4009 
 
0.2934 
  
0.056 
 
0.0269 
 )0.489(  )0.490(  )0.455(  )0.009(  )0.017(  
    
 
 
 
     
Total 
Settlements 
 0.2284 
 
0.8167 
 
0.6481 
  
0.0245 
 
0.1102 
 )0.420(  )0.387(  )0.478(  )0.008(  )0.128(  
    
 
 
 
     
Zefat  0.4098 
 
0.6089 
 
0.4807 
  
0.0656 
 
0.0386 
  )0.493(  )0.489(  )0.501(  )0.014(  )0.028(  
    
                    
 
 
3. Empirical Specifications 
 
The main goal of our empirical model is to test whether the number of recent 
fatalities and the associated economic costs of war and terrorism affect 
individuals’ political preferences.  To this end, we estimate the following 
econometric model using the individual as our unit of observation: 
 
 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑠 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝐴𝑗𝑠 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐴𝑗𝑠2 + 𝛼3𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑗𝑠 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑠 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑠  (1) 
 
where 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑠 is a dummy variable equal to one if individual i, which resides 
in sub-district j at the time of survey s (note that a survey might take place 
more than once a year), holds an accommodating position towards territorial 
concessions, and zero otherwise; 𝐶𝐴𝑗𝑠  is the number of war and terror 
fatalities per capita in sub-district j within the year prior to survey s.  
Following Gould and Klor (2010), we allow for a non-linear effect by 
including a quadratic term.  To the extent that terrorist activities induce a more 
compromising stance of Israelis towards the Palestinians, this quadratic term 
intends to capture the idea that terrorist activity may become ‘counter-
productive’ when casualty counts surpass a certain threshold (Gould and Klor, 
2010).  Reversely, however, it might also be that limited terrorist activity 
hardens Israelis’ stance, but that (very) high casualty numbers change their 
evaluation of the costs of standing firm.  In both cases, a non-linear effect 
would materialize, though its nature and interpretation would, of course, differ 
substantially.  Note that, in certain specifications, we also include the 
aggregate number of fatalities in Israel in addition to the number of sub-
district fatalities.7   
We denote by 𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑗𝑠 the variable measuring economic activity in district 
j at time of survey s.  As mentioned above, we focus on the number of 
(Jewish) workers in tourism as a share of total employees in sub-district j 
within four quarters prior to survey s as our main proxy to the economic 
consequences of war and terror attacks.  𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑠 is a vector of individual-level 
characteristics included in every survey.  This contains information on 
individuals’ gender, age, schooling, ethnicity, religiosity, income and place of 
birth.  We use 𝛿𝑗 to denote sub-district fixed-effects and 𝜇𝑠 to denote survey 
fixed effects.  While the latter controls for aggregate trends in political 
preferences (and may also capture changes over time in the wording of the 
question), the former controls for unobserved characteristics of the sub-
districts.  The error term 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑠 captures unobserved determinants of the 
individual’s political preferences.  All regressions below cluster their standard 
errors at the sub-district level to accommodate the (possible) non-
independence of observations on individuals in the same district. 
The aim of the econometric specification is to estimate α3, which 
captures the impact of the economic costs of war and terrorism on individuals’ 
political views.  Identification of α3 is based on the idea that economic costs of 
war may differentially affect the political views of individuals because the 
extent of war or terror attacks, as measured by their number of local fatalities, 
may inflict larger or smaller economic costs on certain locations relative to 
others based on the pre-existing size and characteristics of each sub-district 
                                                 
7 Note that the specifications including this variable do not include surveys’ fixed effects. 
 tourism sector [for a similar approach, see Gould and Klor (2010) and Berrebi 
and Klor (2008)]. 
We should note at this point that even though the level of tourism is 
likely to be largely driven by the extent of overall violence in the region (see 
above), we cannot completely exclude that variations in touristic activity 
across sub-districts and time are influenced by other factors besides armed 
violence.  To isolate the effect of armed violence on our tourism measure, we 
turn to an alternative two-stage approach.  Specifically, we run the following 
first-stage model to estimate the economic costs associated with war and terror 
attacks: 
 
𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑗𝑠 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐶𝐴𝑗𝑠 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝜀𝑗𝑠      (2) 
 
where 𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑗𝑠, 𝐶𝐴𝑗𝑠, 𝛿𝑗 and 𝜇𝑠 are all defined above.  We then replace the 
actual values of ECO in model (1) by its predicted values obtained from model 
(2).8  This procedure yields the following second-stage model: 
 
𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑠 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐶𝑂�𝑗𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑠 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑠    (3) 
 
Accordingly, in model (3), 𝛽1 captures the impact of fluctuations in economic 
activity due to war and terrorism.  This indirect approach allows us to obtain a 
more accurate estimate of the effect of the economic costs of the conflict on 
public opinion.  The section below presents the results of these estimations. 
 
4. Results 
 
This section presents the results on the effects that the economic costs of war 
and terrorism have on individuals’ willingness to make territorial concessions 
to the Palestinians (while controlling for the number of fatalities from war and 
terrorism).  
Table 4 shows the main results, based on the estimation of model (1), 
which focuses on the effect that the actual share of workers in the tourism 
sector at the sub-district level has on individuals’ political preferences.  In the 
first column of the table we focus exclusively on sub-district variation.  
Columns (2) and (3) add also aggregate variation in fatalities and economic 
conditions, which forces us to eliminate survey fixed effects from these 
specifications.   
                                                 
8 In alternative specifications we added lagged values of ECO and CA as explanatory variables 
in model (2).  This accounts for the possibility that there is some persistence on the level of 
employment on the tourism sector and that it may take time for conflict to affect this variable.  
Importantly, the results of equation (3) are basically the same whether or not these lagged 
variables are included in model (2). 
 Table 4 - The Effects of the Economic Costs of Conflict on Individuals' Willingness to Grant 
Concessions 
 Variable (1) (2) (3)  
Fatalities per Capita:     
 
Linear Effect -0.884** -1.677** -1.525**  
 
 (0.412) (0.719) (0.7)  
 
Quadratic Effect 2.246*** 4.328*** 3.834  
 
 (0.902) (1.523) (1.515)  
 
Total Israeli fatalities per capita 
 
0.019 0.787  
 
 (0.686) (0.682)  
Share of Workers in the Tourism Sector by Subdistrict 0.07 0.985 0.609  
 
 (0.776) (0.887) (0.823)  
Total Share of Workers in the Tourism Sector 
  
11.617***  
 
 (2.396)  
Personal characteristics:     
 
Age 0.0115*** 0.0115*** 0.0115***  
 
 (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)  
 
Age Square -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***  
 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
 
Male -0.0034 -0.0031 -0.0026  
 
 (0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0083)  
 
Years of Schooling 0.0224*** 0.0245*** 0.0243***  
 
 (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.005)  
 
Years of Schooling * Age -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003***  
 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)  
 
Immigrant -0.0285** -0.0342*** -0.0308**  
 
 (0.0124) (0.0127) (0.0126)  
 
African-Asian ethnicity -0.0687*** -0.0709*** -0.067  
 
 (0.0091) (0.0093) (0.0092)  
 
From former Soviet bloc -0.1353*** -0.1288*** -0.1341***  
 
 (0.017) (0.0179) (0.0178)  
 
Religiously observant -0.2275*** -0.2202*** -0.2243***  
 
 (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0106)  
 
Average expenditures -0.0353*** -0.0321*** -0.0309***  
 
 (0.0096) (0.0102) (0.0101)  
 
Below Average Expenditures -0.0688*** -0.0699*** -0.0685***  
 
 (0.0103) (0.0108) (0.0108)  
Survey fixed effects Yes No No  
Number of Observations 15,504 15,504 15,504 
 R-squared 0.157 0.1332 0.1357 
 P-value on effect of fatalities 0.0448 0.0133 0.0391 
 Notes: The dependent variable is the individuals' willingness to grant concessions. All regressions are 
estimated using a linear probability model. All regressions include sub-district fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the sub-district-survey level, appear in parentheses. * indicates 
statistically significant at 10% level, ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates 
statistically significant at 1% level. 
 
The results in the first two columns show that the impact of the share of 
workers in tourism at the sub-district level is positive but not statistically 
 significant.  This implies that the local economic costs of war and terrorism do 
not appear to have an independent effect on individuals’ willingness to make 
territorial concessions to the Palestinians.9   
In contrast, both columns show a consistent and significant effect of 
fatalities on the political preferences of Israelis.  The coefficient estimates 
suggest that the number of fatalities reduces an individual’s willingness to 
grant concessions at low levels of fatalities, but that fatalities work in the 
opposite direction once the death toll becomes very high.  The magnitudes of 
the coefficients in column (1) imply that the total effect of fatalities is negative 
up until 0.1968 local fatalities per capita.  Fatalities beyond that point make 
Israelis adopt a more compromising stance towards the Palestinians.  That 
said, the turning point is reached only for very high levels of fatalities.  In fact, 
our data contain only three cells with a number of fatalities higher than that 
threshold, and all occurred during the Second Palestinian uprising in the sub-
district composed by all the settlements located beyond the “Green Line” (July 
2002, January 2003 and April 2003).   
This pattern, found in almost every estimated specification, contrasts 
with results reported in Gould and Klor (2010).  This reversal is probably 
driven by important differences between our dataset and the one used by 
Gould and Klor (2010).  First, our data on fatalities include civilians and 
soldiers while Gould and Klor (2010) focus exclusively on non-combatant 
fatalities.  In addition, we include in the analysis individuals living in 
settlements beyond the green line.  While the number of individuals in this 
sub-district is relatively small, the number of fatalities per capita in the 
settlements is much higher compared to fatalities inside the green line (see 
summary statistics in Table 3).  Finally, by combining the INES and DIS 
surveys we are able to include in the analysis every year between 1996 to 
2009, while Gould and Klor (2010) only use the INES survey and focus 
exclusively on election years between 1988-2006.  Importantly, when we 
constrain the analysis to election years we obtain results in line with those 
reported by Gould and Klor (2010), regardless of the other differences 
mentioned above.10 
The third column of this table adds to the estimated models the share of 
employees in the tourism sector at the national level.  This variable has a 
positive and significant effect on the individuals’ political preferences, which 
may suggest that Israeli citizens adopt less accommodating views towards 
territorial concessions to the Palestinians as a result of bad economic shocks 
                                                 
9  The effects of local fluctuations of workers in the tourism sector remain insignificant also 
when we exclude the number of fatalities from war and terrorism from the specifications or 
when we include only the linear effect of this variable.  
10 The general results in Table 4 remain the same when we estimate model (1) only for the 
subsample of surveys that use the same wording for the question on individuals’ willingness to 
grant concessions.  These surveys are the ones from 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, 1/2003, 
2005, and 3/2006. 
 due to a more violent environment.  Reversely, when a relatively peaceful 
period induces a rise in the share of individuals employed in the tourism 
sector, Israelis’ support for territorial concessions increases.  For obvious 
reasons, we cannot include year fixed-effects in this regression.  Therefore, we 
cannot exclude the possibility that general factors other than the economic 
costs of war are at work here to generate the significant coefficient.  For 
example, the timing of the Second Intifada coincided with Al-Qaeda’s attack 
to the twin towers, the beginning of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a 
slowdown of the world economy.  All these factors certainly have an effect on 
the Israeli economy and the views of Israeli citizens. 
The rest of the control variables included in the three specifications 
show very robust results, which are in line with those reported by Gould and 
Klor (2010), Berrebi and Klor (2008), and Shamir and Arian (1999), among 
many others.  Specifically, individuals’ willingness to grant concessions 
increases with income, education and age (up to a certain point).  In addition, 
native Israelis tend to hold more accommodating views than immigrants, and 
the same holds for secular individuals compared to religious ones.  In contrast, 
immigrants from the former Soviet Union and individuals with an Asia-Africa 
ethnic background tend to have a harder stance on average.11  
Table 5 reports the results of estimating model (3), whereby the 
predicted share of workers in the tourism sector is estimated according to 
equation (2).  As this predicted share is estimated using the number of 
fatalities as the main explanatory variable, we are not able to include the 
number of fatalities directly as an explanatory variable in the second stage due 
to perfect multicollinearity.  The results of this estimation show that the 
expected share of workers in the tourism industry at the sub-district level has a 
positive and significant effect on the willingness of individuals to grant 
territorial concessions to the Palestinians.  This result seems to suggest that, in 
addition to their direct effect on political views through body counts, conflicts 
have also an important indirect effect on individuals’ attitudes through their 
economic costs.  We take this result with caution, however, because the 
estimated coefficient on local economic costs may be affected by the omission 
of local fatalities from the regression.  In addition, as seen in the second 
column of the same table which includes local fatalities, the effect of the 
predicted level of total workers in the tourism sector, while positive, is not 
statistically significant.   
 
 
                                                 
11 The overwhelming support for the right wing block of parties and hawkish attitudes of 
immigrants from the former Soviet Union is well documented in the related literature (see, 
e.g., Goldstein and Gitelman, 2004).  Halperin et al. (2009) use a survey to show that the 
political views of immigrants from the former Soviet Union are amplified during violent 
periods due to their relatively higher sensitivity to terrorism and political violence compared to 
that of the native population.  
 Table 5 - The Effects of the Economic Costs of Conflict on Individuals' Willingness to Grant Concessions 
Variable 1 2 
Fatalities per Capita:   
 
Linear Effect 
 
-1.509** 
 
 (0.694) 
 
Quadratic Effect 
 
3.859** 
 
 (1.519) 
 
Total Israeli fatalities per capita -0.275 
 
 
 (0.423) 
Predicted Share of Workers in the Tourism Sector 
by Subdistrict 17. 008*** 
 
 
 (2.528) 
Total Share of Workers in the Tourism Sector 
  
 
 
Predicted Total Share of Workers in the Tourism 
Sector 
 
1.734 
 
 (8.056) 
Personal characteristics:   
 
Age 0.0117*** 0.0115*** 
 
 (0.0017) (0.0017) 
 
Age Square -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Male -0.0021 -0.0025 
 
 (0.0083) (0.0082) 
 
Years of Schooling 0.024*** 0.0242*** 
 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
 
Years of Schooling * Age -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
 
Immigrant -0.0292** -0.0308** 
 
 (0.0124) (0.0126) 
 
African-Asian ethnicity -0.0671*** -0.0669*** 
 
 (0.0093) (0.0092) 
 
From former Soviet bloc -0.1364*** -0.1341*** 
 
 (0.0173) (0.0178) 
 
Religiously observant -0.2289*** -0.2244*** 
 
 (0.0108) (0.0106) 
 
Average expenditures -0.032*** -0.031*** 
 
 (0.0101) (0.0102) 
 
Below Average Expenditures -0.0675*** -0.0687*** 
 
 (0.0109) (0.0107) 
Survey fixed effects Yes No 
Number of Observations 15,504 15,504 
R-squared 0.1405 0.1356 
P-value on effect of fatalities 
 
0. 0373 
Notes: The dependent variable is the individuals' willingness to grant concessions. All regressions are estimated using 
a linear probability model. All regressions include sub-district fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for 
clustering at the sub-district-survey level, appear in parentheses. * indicates statistically significant at 10% level, ** 
indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level. 
  
Tables 6 and 7 explore the sensitivity of our results to two alternative 
measures of political preferences: self-reported political orientation and the 
support for parties in the right-wing bloc in upcoming elections.  The overall 
picture from Tables 6 and 7 is very similar to that of Tables 4 and 5.  As with 
our results on willingness to grant territorial concessions, we do not find a 
consistently significant effect of the sub-district share of workers in the 
tourism sector on individuals’ self-reported political tendency.  Although most 
specifications suggest that the economic costs of war, as measured by the 
actual share of workers in tourism, cause Israelis to adopt more left-leaning 
views, the estimated coefficients are not statistically significant when we 
include survey fixed effects (Column 1) or variables aggregated at the national 
level (Column 3).  In addition, the results in Table 7 suggest that an increase in 
the share of workers in the tourism sector tends to reduce the respondent’s 
intentions to vote for the right bloc of political parties in the upcoming 
elections.  Although this is consistent with results in Table 4, this effect is, 
once again, not significant across all specifications. 
The coefficients on fatalities and the control variables tend to preserve 
their signs and significance as in the previous estimations.  One interesting 
change we observe in Table 7 concerns the insignificance of sub-district 
fatalities (both when using a linear and quadratic specification).  This goes 
against findings reported in Berrebi and Klor (2008), who find that local 
attacks turned voters towards right-wing parties.  The difference might reflect 
different (reported) political behavior in years of elections and years between 
elections: the latter are included in our models, but not in Berrebi and Klor 
(2008).   
 
Table 6 - The Effects of the Economic Costs of Conflict on Individuals' Political Tendencies 
  
Estimation of Model 1 Estimation of Model 3 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fatalities per Capita:      
 
Linear Effect 0.754** 0.584** 0.765* 
 
0.744* 
 
 (0.364) (0.417) (0.415) (0.418) 
 
Quadratic Effect -2.219** -1.537*** -2.124* 
 
-2.158* 
 
 (0.902) (1.146) (1.105) (1.106) 
 
Total Israeli fatalities per capita 
 
0.616 1.493*** 1.076*** 
 
 
 (0.416) (0.447) (0.298) 
Share of Workers in the Tourism Sector by Subdistrict 0.582 2,584*** 0.83 4.925** 
 
 
 (0.664) (0.866) (0.801) (2.039) 
Total Share of Workers in the Tourism Sector 
  
12.948*** 
 
-4.771 
 
 (2.322) (4.809) 
Personal characteristics:      
 
Age 
-
0.0085*** 
-
0.0085*** 
-
0.0085*** 
-
0.0085*** 
-
0.0085*** 
 
 (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
 
Age Square 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
Male 0.049*** 0.0485*** 0.0489*** 0.0484*** 0.0487*** 
 
 (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0078) 
 
Years of Schooling -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 
 
 (0. 0048) (0.0048) (0.0078) (0.0048) (0.0048) 
 
Years of Schooling * Age 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 
 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
 
Immigrant 0.0278** 0.022** 0.0256** 0.0225** 0.0257** 
 
 (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
 
African-Asian ethnicity 0.1028*** 0.0956*** 0.0996*** 0.0966*** 0.0995*** 
 
 (0.0101) (0.01) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) 
 
From former Soviet bloc 0.1398*** 0.147*** 0.1412*** 0.1463*** 0.1411*** 
 
 (0.0168) (0.0165)  (0.0165) (0.0164) (0.0165) 
 
Religiously observant 0.3016*** 0.3028*** 0.2983*** 0.3017*** 0.2984*** 
 
 (0.0104) (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) 
 
Average expenditures 0.0563*** 0.0513*** 0.0525*** 0.0507*** 0.0527*** 
 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 
Below Average Expenditures 0.0779*** 0.0766*** 0.078*** 0.0767*** 0.0783*** 
 
 (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) 
Survey fixed effects Yes No No Yes No 
Number of Observations 16,194 16,194 16,194 16,194 16,194 
R-squared 0.174 0.1653 0.1681 0.1652 0.168 
P-value on effect of fatalities 0.0574 0.3484 0.1379   0.1405 
Notes: The dependent variable is the individuals' identification with a right wing political tendency. All regressions are 
estimated using a linear probability model. All regressions include sub-district fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted 
for clustering at the sub-district-survey level, appear in parentheses. * indicates statistically significant at 10% level, ** 
indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level. 
 
Table 7 - The Effects of the Economic Costs of Conflict on Individuals' Political Tendencies 
  
Estimation of Model 1 Estimation of Model 3 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fatalities per Capita:      
 
Linear Effect 0.495 0.486 0.4 
 
0.4 
 
 (0.406) (0.474) (0.465) (0.464) 
 
Quadratic Effect -1.53 -1.509 -1.23 
 
-1.231 
 
 (0.952) (1.084) (1.083) (1.083) 
 
Total Israeli fatalities per capita 
 
1.01*** 0.599 1.0725*** 
 
 
 (0.387) (0.447) (0.2464) 
Share of Workers in the Tourism Sector by Subdistrict 0.021 -0.811 0.026 -5.34*** 
 
 
 (0.596) (0.549) (0.626) (2.044) 
Total Share of Workers in the Tourism Sector 
  
-6.059** 
 
-
13.327*** 
 
 (2.415) (4.669) 
       
Personal characteristics: 
     
 
Age 
-
0.0082*** 
-
0.0082*** 
-
0.0082*** 
-
0.0082*** 
-
0.0082*** 
 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
 
Age Square 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Male 0.0453*** 0.0455*** 0.0452*** 0.0453*** 0.0452*** 
 
 (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0074) 
        
 
Years of Schooling 
-
0.0293*** 
-
0.0294*** 
-
0.0293*** 
-
0.0293*** 
-
0.0293*** 
 
 (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) 
 
Years of Schooling * Age 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 
 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
 
Immigrant 0.0136 0.0207** 0.019* 0.0196* 0.019* 
 
 (0.0102) (0.001) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
African-Asian ethnicity 0.0998*** 0.1001*** 0.0982*** 0.0991*** 0.0982*** 
 
 (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) 
 
From former Soviet bloc 0.1604*** 0.1547*** 0.1577*** 0.1567*** 0.1577*** 
 
 (0.017) (0.0166) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0167) 
 
Religiously observant 0.287*** 0.2835*** 0.2856*** 0.2858 0.2856*** 
 
 (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) 
 
Average expenditures 0.0494*** 0.0482*** 0.0478*** 0.0482*** 0.0478*** 
 
 (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0088) (0.0089) (0.0088) 
 
Below Average Expenditures 0.0661*** 0.0678*** 0.0672*** 0.0671*** 0.0672*** 
 
 (0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) 
Survey fixed effects Yes No No Yes No 
Number of Observations 16,469 16,469 16,469 16,469 16,469 
R-squared 0.1505 0.1466 0.1472 0.1471 0.1472 
P-value on effect of fatalities 0.2661 0.3553 0.5123   0.5115 
Notes: The dependent variable is the individuals' intention to vote for a pary in the right bloc of parties in the upcoming 
elections. All regressions are estimated using a linear probability model. All regressions include sub-district fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the sub-district-survey level, appear in parentheses. * indicates statistically 
significant at 10% level, ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
There is widespread consensus in the political economy literature that the 
human toll associated with war and terrorism has a significant effect on 
individuals’ political attitudes.  Particularly, a higher death toll from a long-
lasting violent political conflict has recurrently been shown to undermine the 
public’s support for both the conflict and the country’s political leaders.  This 
paper analyzes a possible transmission mechanism connecting violent conflicts 
and individuals’ political opinions: namely, the economy.  Given growing 
evidence that wars and periods of increased terrorist activity often have 
substantial economic impacts (see Arunatilake et al., 2001; Abadie and 
Gardeazabal, 2003 and 2008; Fielding, 2003a and 2003b; Koubi, 2005; 
Zussman and Zussman, 2006; Sandler and Enders, 2008; and Blomberg and 
Rose, 2009; among many others) and that the economic situation of a country 
affects individuals’ political opinions and behavior (Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmayer, 2007), the intuition underlying the potential importance of such 
economic mechanism is straightforward.  That is, “if the casualty estimates 
mount to the thousands, if oil prices skyrocket, if a war pushes the economy 
into recession or requires a large tax increase (…), then decision-makers in the 
 White House and the Congress might not post so expeditiously to battle” 
(Nordhaus, 2002, 51). 
In our empirical analysis, we exploited variation in the level of violence 
across time and space in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, together with Israeli 
localities’ different exposure to the tourism sector (and, therefore, their 
varying exposure to the economic costs of the conflict), to differentiate 
between the human toll of terror and war and the economic costs they cause.  
We focused on the (local) tourism industry because this is often directly and 
immediately affected by (local) acts of aggression.  Therefore, this industry 
exhibits variation both across time and space that makes it an ideal sector for 
the purpose of our study.  Income growth or unemployment rates arguably 
represent more general measures of economic activity, but these are 
predominantly driven by numerous factors besides the conflict, and are 
therefore much less informative for the purpose at hand. 
Our results confirm that fatalities significantly affect Israelis’ 
willingness to grant territorial concessions to the Palestinians (our central 
political variable). Yet, they do not show a consistent significant effect from 
the economic costs of violent conflict (measured through the share of Israelis 
employed in the tourism sector) on individuals’ political attitudes.  The 
absence of economic effects in the Israel-Palestine conflict does not imply that 
such economic effects may not play a more substantial role in other conflicts.  
Moreover, given the close connection between the human and economics costs 
of violent conflicts (e.g., due to the destruction of human capital), evaluating 
the presence of both mechanisms may be critical to avoid incorrect inferences 
on the causal effect of either. 
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